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Lou Fisher’s proliﬁc writings on the war power—the constitutional repository of authority to ini-tiate war and lesser military hostilities on behalfof the American people—have informed and, forthe better part of four decades, shaped discus-
sions and debates on the respective roles of Congress and the
president, from the halls of academe to the corridors of power.
Widely cited and invoked on hundreds of occasions by polit-
ical scientists, historians, and legal academics, his work has
opened doors for serious consideration of his views by repre-
sentatives in all three branches of the federal government. It
has, as well, established his place in the front-rank of consti-
tutional scholars and, almost certainly, earned for his schol-
arship an enduring inﬂuence on discussions about the
constitutional authority to order the use of military force.
Fisher’s thesis is clear and convincing. TheWar Clause of
the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have
Power . . .TodeclareWar,” vests inCongress the sole andexclu-
sive authority to initiate allmilitary hostilities on behalf of the
American people (Art. I, Sec. 8). The president, in his capacity
as commander in chief, has the authority to repel invasions of
theUnited States, and the power to conductwar once declared
or otherwise authorized by Congress, but possesses no consti-
tutionalpower toauthorize theuseof force.Until 1950,nopres-
ident had asserted a unilateral executive power to initiate war.
Beginning, however, with Harry Truman’s decision to deploy
troops to Korea—without congressional authorization—every
president except Dwight Eisenhower has laid claim to a presi-
dential war power. As a result, Americans have witnessed, for
the past half century, a string of presidential wars in direct vio-
lationof theWarClauseof theConstitution.AsFisherhaswrit-
ten,“[t]hedriftof thewarpowerfromCongress tothePresident
afterWorldWar II is unmistakable” (Fisher 2004, 261).
Fisher’s penetrating analysis of the purported legal bases
of executive warmaking, including his examination of textual
assertions of a presidential power to initiate military hostili-
ties, have thoroughly discredited executive branch eﬀorts to
circumvent congressional authorization—the sine qua non for
the constitutional use of force.Thus, the president has neither
an extra-constitutional nor an inherent power to wage war
(Fisher 2004, 20–22, 69–73; Fisher 2007a, 1–22; Fisher 2007b,
139–52). Presidential resort to an act of authorization of mili-
tary force by an international organization such as the United
Nations or NATO, is unavailing because treaties, which are
made by the president and Senate and do not include a role
for the House of Representatives, fall short of the constitu-
tional requirement of an aﬃrmative vote by both houses of
Congress (Fisher 1997, 1237–279; Fisher 2004, 81–99, 105–14,
169–74, 175–201; Fisher 2012, 176–89). Policy arguments, not
grounded in the Constitution, have no currency. At all events,
the Constitution requires congressional authorization for the
use of military force.
Presidential usurpation of the war power, like congressio-
nal abdication of its constitutional duty to decide on matters
of war and peace, has grave consequences. It poses, as Fisher
has observed, “a threat to constitutional government, civil lib-
erties, and national security” at home and abroad. “It repre-
sents, moreover, the culmination over the past 50 years of
unilateral presidential wars accompanied by few checks from
Congress or the judiciary. Academics, the media, and the gen-
eral public have shown little understanding of constitutional
limits and little interest in keeping the president within legal
bounds” (Fisher 2006, 23–52).
Indiﬀerence to presidential warmaking, however, does not
diminish its danger to constitutional values, republican prin-
ciples, and the national interest. As Fisher has pointed out,
President Lyndon Johnson feared the impact on his own polit-
ical fortunes of a decision he might make to withdraw the
United States from Vietnam, despite his conclusion that the
war was unwinnable. He feared being labeled soft on commu-
nism. Moreover, “[i]nstead of formulating a plan for the
national interest,” Fisher noted, Johnson determined to lie
“‘in the pursuit of self-interest’” (Fisher 2000, 51; Fisher 2006,
25). Misleading statements, and outright deception by presi-
dents, including James K. Polk, Harry S. Truman, Ronald
Reagan, and GeorgeW. Bush, among others, run deep in our
history, as Fisher has written, and underscore the dangers of
unilateral presidential war making (Fisher 2010, 171–84).
Fisher’s consistent defense of congressional control of the
war power rests on constitutional principles, not on partisan
concerns, and certainly not on a naïve assumption that Con-
gress will always reach a wise or correct decision. He is not so
much “pro-Congress” as he is “pro-Constitution.” Indeed, he
has been critical of Congress for its abdication and surrender
of its constitutional power and responsibility to make deci-
sions onmatters of war and peace. In the wake of presidential
aggrandizement of the war power in the Vietnam War, for
example, Congress might have revived and defended its con-
stitutional authority over matters of war and peace. “Instead
of reasserting congressional power, the War Powers Resolu-
tion marked an abject surrender of legislative prerogatives to
the president” (Fisher 2000, 13; Fisher and Adler 1998, 1–20).
Still, he embraces the idea that wiser decisions in foreign, as
in domestic aﬀairs, are made through reliance on checks and
balances, shared decision making and the cross-ﬁre of debate
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support in the historical record that reveals the ﬂaws of uni-
lateral executive actions, grounded inmisperception, poor judg-
ment, political motives and ambition, and faulty intelligence,
not to mention acts of presidential deception (Fisher 2000,
51–66; Fisher 2004, 202–35; Fisher 2010, 171–84).
Fisher’s defense of the constitutional principles that gov-
ern the use of military force, reﬂective of a nonpartisan anal-
ysis, haswon, at various times, praise and commendation from
both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill. Presiden-
tial usurpation of the war power, often the target of Fisher’s
criticisms, has not endeared him to the executive branch.Occa-
sionally, however, executive oﬃcials, with the beneﬁt of hind-
sight, have belatedly and, perhaps surprisingly, embraced
Fisher’s scholarly conclusions. FormerWhite House Counsel
to President Richard Nixon, John Dean, whose own critical
works on the abuse of power have earned for him redemption
and considerable respect fromprevious critics, has justly char-
acterized Fisher’s highly acclaimed, best-selling Presidential
War Power, as the premier book on the subject (Dean 2007,
314).
On publication of the ﬁrst edition ofPresidentialWar Power
(1995), the distinguished historian, Theodore Draper, wrote
for the New York Times Book Review a trenchant and enthu-
siastic critique of the book. Draper exalted Fisher’s success in
refuting the claims by US presidents of a unilateral executive
power to initiate military hostilities. He observed that ever
since theKoreanWar, “Presidents have been violating theCon-
stitution of the United States,” and declared that Fisher “had
taken on all of the Presidents and their lawyers who have con-
trived for almost half a century to oﬀer excuses for autono-
mous Presidential war-making.” Draper described Fisher’s
book as “a hygienic eﬀort to bring us back to the law” (Draper
1995, 1).
Fisher’s works on thewar power, like hismany other books
and some 400 articles on a variety of constitutional issues,
have been written in characteristically lean and lucid prose
with a clarity rarely achieved among academics. They reﬂect
clear premises, thorough and illuminating archival research,
balanced analysis, and conclusions grounded in and directed
by the evidence. His framework for analysis taps the corner-
stones of convention for legal scholars: constitutional text,
debates in the Constitutional and State Ratifying Conven-
tions, commentary contemporaneous with the framing of the
Constitution, governmental practice in the early years of the
republic, and judicial rulings. He has, as the New York Times
observed, taken on “all comers” and come to grips with views
and arguments of scholars and government oﬃcials who have
advanced the claim of a unilateral presidential authority to
commence war.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES
We can learn a great deal about the work of the Constitu-
tional Convention, not merely from what was done there, but
also from what was said. TheWar Clause grants to Congress
power “to Declare War.” Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion declares: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of theMilitia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States.”To the extent that these provisionsmay require
reconciliation, Fisher turns to the debates in the Philadelphia
Convention. They reveal, Fisher wrote in Presidential War
Power, “that the framers were determined to circumscribe the
President’s authority to take unilateralmilitary actions” (Fisher
2004, 8).The nature of the debates on the power to initiate
war leave no doubt that the framers vested that authority in
Congress alone.
Fisher’s unerring narration of the Convention debates is
clear and eﬃcient. An early draft had empowered Congress to
“make war.” OnAugust 17—the second, ﬁnal, andmost signif-
icant day of debate on the war power, which coincidentally
falls on Fisher’s birthday although he claims not to have been
present at the creation—Charles Pinckney objected that legis-
lative proceedings were “too slow” for the safety of the coun-
try in an emergency, because he expected Congress to meet
but once a year. JamesMadison and Elbridge Gerry, in a joint
motion, proposed to substitute “declare” for “make,” leaving
to the president “the power to repel sudden attacks.” Their
motion carried on a vote of 7 to 2.When Rufus King explained
that the word “make” would allow the president to conduct
war, whichwas an “Executive function,” Connecticut changed
its vote and the ﬁnal tally became 8 to 1 (Fisher 2004, 3–6;10;
Farrand 1966, 2: 318–19).
The meaning of the debate was unmistakable. Congress,
alone, would possess the authority to initiate war; the presi-
dentwould exercise authority to repel invasions. Because inva-
sion represented a grave emergency, the president, in his
capacity as Commander in Chief, was empowered “to take
actions necessary to resist sudden attacks either against the
mainland of the United States or against American troops
abroad.” But the president, Fisher observed, “never received a
general power to deploy troops whenever and wherever he
thought best, and the framers did not authorize him to take
the country into full-scale war or tomount an oﬀensive attack
against another nation.” That was the sole province of Con-
gress (Fisher 2004, 8–9).
The framers’ decision to assign thewar power to Congress,
rather than the president, represented a dramatic rejection of
the executive model for war and foreign aﬀairs, a design prac-
ticed in England and the world over. Delegates, as Fisher
explains, were familiar with the fact that kings and despots
and tyrants had often marched their people into war, for less
than meritorious reasons, and usually for their own personal
or political motivations. Given the framers’ emphasis on col-
lective decision making, and their rejection of executive uni-
lateralism, the Convention, as JamesWilson of Pennsylvania
declared, was designed to prevent one man from hurrying “us
into war.” On the contrary, “it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of
men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of
declaring war is vested in the legislature at large” (Elliot 1836,
2: 528; Fisher 2004, 9).
By the end of the Convention, no delegate was on record
as supporting the concept of a unilateral executive power to
initiate war or military hostilities. Indeed, during the course
of debates, only one man, Pierce Butler, wanted to vest the
war power in the president whom, he argued, “will have the
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requisite qualities, andwill notmakewar butwhen theNation
will support it.” The framers, as Fisher wrote, “uniformly
rejected his proposal.” Give Butler credit for being a quick
study. He took his lumps fromdelegates whowere shocked, as
Elbridge Gerry put it, because “he never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare
war.” But by the end of the debate on August 17, Butler not
only reversed his position, but introduced a measure on the
ﬂoor that would vest in the legislature the authority to end
war, just as it enjoyed the authority to initiate war. In the
South Carolina Ratifying Convention, Butler told his fellow
delegates that a particular delegate had had the temerity to
propose a presidential war power but that the delegates had
rejected the idea. He made no mention of the name of the
author of that proposal (Fisher 2004, 9; Adler 2003, 972–73).
INFLUENCES ONTHE CONVENTION
The Convention’s constitutional design for initiating war, as
Fisher has demonstrated, was shaped in large measure by the
framers’ commitment to republican governance,which empha-
sized shared decision making and checks and balances, and
rejected unilateral executive power. The delegates’ deep-
seated fear of executive power, born of their own experience
and their reading of history, led them to break from the
monarchical model that governed England and much of the
world and that placed in the hands of the executive sole author-
ity over matters of war and national security. The framers, as
Fisher has explained, dramatically rejected the “executive
model” and granted to Congress, not the president, exclusive
control over the decision to go to war as well as the lion’s
share of foreign aﬀairs authority. The Convention’s blueprint
was admirably summed up by James Madison in words that
Fisher views as authoritative: “Those who are to conduct a war
cannot in thenature of things, be proper or safe judges,whether
a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are
barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free
government, analogous to thatwhich separates the sword from
the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enact-
ing laws” (Fisher 2004, 11).
History and experience provided a valuable guide to the
Convention. “In their study of past governments,” Fisher
wrote,” the framers understood that executives, in search of
fame and glory, had an appetite for war” (Fisher 2006, 25).
Fisher’s conclusion is grounded in John Jay’s insights in Fed-
eralist No. 4, where the Secretary of Foreign Aﬀairs under the
Articles of Confederationwarned that “nations in general will
make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything
by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects
merely personal, such as a thirst formilitary glory, revenge for
personal aﬀronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize
or support their particular families or partisans. These and a
variety of other motives, which aﬀect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctiﬁed by
justice or the voice and interests of his people” (Fisher 2004,
10).
Jay’s insights echoed throughout the early years of the
republic. Madison, for example, wrote in 1793, that war is “the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement. . . In war, the honors
and emoluments of oﬃce are to be multiplied; and it is the
executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is
in war, ﬁnally, that laurels are to be gathered; and it is the
executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions
and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambi-
tion, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are
all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.” Five
years later, as Fisher observed, Madison wrote to Thomas Jef-
ferson that the Constitution “supposes, what the History of
all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power
most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly
with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legsl”
(Fisher 2004, 10).
THE EARLY REPUBLIC
The understanding of theConvention, as Fisher has described
it, was embraced by the various state ratifying conventions,
and aﬃrmed in the Federalist Papers, government practice,
and judicial decisions in the early period of the republic—
without dissent. The ratiﬁers’ understanding of the allocation
of the war power was illuminated in North Carolina, where
James Iredell, soon to be a member of the US Supreme Court,
distinguished, in words that reﬂected Alexander Hamilton’s
analysis in Federalist No. 69, the limited authority of the pres-
ident with that of the English monarch. The English King,
wrote Iredell, was not only Commander in Chief “but has
power, in time of war, to raise ﬂeets and armies. He also has
authority to declare war.” In contrast, the president “has not
the power of declaring war by his own authority, nor that of
raising ﬂeets. Those powers are vested in other hands. The
power of declaring war is expressly given to Congress.” In
The framers’ decision to assign the war power to Congress, rather than the president,
represented a dramatic rejection of the executive model for war and foreign aﬀairs, a
design practiced in England and the world over. Delegates, as Fisher explains, were
familiar with the fact that kings and despots and tyrants had often marched their people
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South Carolina, Charles Pinckney assured his colleagues that
the “President’s powers did not permit him to declare war”
(Fisher 2004, 9–10).
EARLY PRACTICE
Over the past half-century, proponents of an executive war
power have sought to ground their claims in historical prec-
edent, by asserting that early presidents had unilaterally
authorized the use of military force. The compilation of lists
of purported instances of presidential war making, however,
represents little more than an exercise in revisionism that is
betrayed by the historical record. Fisher’s thorough examina-
tion of the practice of going to war in the early republic has
aﬃrmed, and extended, previous historical analyses that have
discredited executive branch assertions of unilateral presiden-
tial war making (Adler 1988, 17–26, 35–36; Fisher 2004, 17–55;
Wormuth and Firmage 1986, 133–150). Fisher has demon-
strated that early presidents—George Washington, John
Adams, and Thomas Jeﬀerson—adhered to the constitutional
design and advanced no claims of a unilateral presidential
power to initiate military hostilities. Washington, for exam-
ple, refused to order the use of force against an Indian tribe
in 1792, on the ground that authority to commence hostili-
ties is constitutionally granted to Congress. In the Quasi-
War with France, 1798–1800, Congress enacted two dozen
statutes authorizing the use of force. Adams made no asser-
tion of a presidential power to initiate hostilities. As presi-
dent, Jeﬀerson was challenged by the attacks of pirates of
Tripoli on US commercial vessels sailing in the Mediterra-
nean. As tempting as it might have been to authorize the
initiation of force against the pirates, Jeﬀerson was yet mind-
ful of the constitutional distinction between oﬀensive acts,
which are within the province of Congress, and defensive
acts, which are within the realm of presidential power (Fisher
2004, 17–36).
Fisher’s painstaking demolition of the contrived lists of
presidential wars in the early republic has undermined eﬀorts
by scholars and oﬃcials to invoke historical practice as an
ally. The fact that the early practice of decision making on
matters ofwar and peace conforms to the constitutional design
has forced revisionists to seek support elsewhere.
JUDICIAL PRACTICE
As Fisher has shown, several judicial decisions arising out of
the Quasi-War that were rendered by the Supreme Court at
the dawnof the republic held thatCongress possesses, asMad-
ison observed, sweeping authority to “commence, conclude
and continue” war. In Bas v. Tingy (1800), the Court held that
it is for Congress, alone, to decide whether a war should be
“perfect” or “imperfect,” that is, general or limited. In addi-
tion, it is for Congress, not the president, to decide where war
may be waged, and whether it might be “limited in place, in
objects, and in time.” In Bas, the Court held that Congress
had authorized “hostilities on the high seas by certain per-
sons in certain cases.” There was no “authority given to com-
mit hostilities on land,” a stricture that sharply limited the
discretion of the Commander in Chief to conduct war (Bas v.
Tingy, 43).
Chief Justice JohnMarshall aﬃrmed the sweep of congres-
sional authority the following year, in Talbot v. Seeman: “The
whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be
resorted to as our guides in this inquiry” (Talbot v. Seeman
1801, 28).
The teaching of these cases, like the Court’s ruling in Little
v. Barreme in 1804, is clear. Fisher has justly stated: “Those
cases do not imply that once Congress authorizes war, the
President is at liberty to choose the time, location, and scope
of military activities. In authorizing war, Congress may place
limits on what presidents may and may not do” (Fisher 2004,
25). In fact, the Court in Barreme, in another opinion deliv-
ered by Marshall, held that the president is bound to obey
statutory commands imposed by Congress in the conduct of
war(Littlev.Barreme,179).Twoyears later, that lessonwasreaf-
ﬁrmed inUnitedStates v. Smith (1806), inanopinionwrittenby
JusticeWilliamPaterson, amember of theConstitutional Con-
vention, while riding circuit. Inwords that have erected a plat-
form for Fisher, Justice Paterson declared: “The President of
theUnited States cannot control the statute nor dispensewith
its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do
what the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execu-
tion of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure; which is a
doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any
supporters in our government” (United States v. Smith, 1230,
quoted inFisher 2004, 25–26, 29–31; Fisher 2005, 469–71).These
decisions have never been overturned and remain good law.
CONTEMPORARY POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
Advocates of a unilateral presidential authority to decide on
matters of war and peace have advanced various policy argu-
ments to defend the shift of power from Congress to the pres-
ident. As Fisher has observed, they tend to focus on “the need
for secrecy and prompt action, qualities supposedly associ-
ated in some unique fashion with the Executive.” These argu-
ments, he concludes, have but “a superﬁcial allure” (Fisher
2004, 261). Fisher rightly dismisses assertions that “the
Fisher’s painstaking demolition of the contrived lists of presidential wars in the early
republic has undermined eﬀorts by scholars and oﬃcials to invoke historical practice as
an ally. The fact that the early practice of decision making on matters of war and peace
conforms to the constitutional design has forced revisionists to seek support elsewhere.
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conditions of the modern world” necessitate placement of the
war power in the hands of the president. After all, in words
that harken to the values and concerns of the framers, if “the
current risk to national security is great, so is the risk of pres-
identialmiscalculation and aggrandizement—all themore rea-
son for insisting that military decisions be thoroughly
examined and approved byCongress. Contemporary presiden-
tial judgments need more, not less, scrutiny” (Fisher 2004,
262).
For Fisher, claims by champions of an executive war power
are apt to place too great a premium on the need for speed and
dispatch and the judgment of the president. The framers,
Fisher notes, understood emergencies, which is why they
vested in the executive the power to repel invasions. But defen-
sive actions beyond defense of the nation andAmerica troops,
even if it involves our allies, require discussion and debate
before risking the blood and treasure of the nation. If, as Fisher
explains, the president perceives an emergency that is afoot in
another part of the world, then he may decide to act and to
seek from Congress retroactive authorization, which was the
framers’ solution to the problem of emergency, and the “pro-
cedure that Lincoln used in the Civil War” (Fisher 2004, 263;
Adler 2012, 376–89).
CONCLUSIONS
The extension of a presidential power to initiate hostilities,
whether in the eighteenth or twenty-ﬁrst century, invites the
very fears that induced the framers to vest in Congress, not
the president, the power to go to war. Separation of powers
issues are enduring, for they raise, fundamentally, the ques-
tion of the repository of decision-making authority. For the
framers in 1787, as for Fisher in 2013, the fundamental value
choices remain the same: executive unilateralism, featuring
the judgment, temperament, and vision of a single person,
versus discussion and debate, collective decision making, and
checks and balances. Unless or until the Constitution is
amended to grant to the president the authority to go to war,
we can expect Lou Fisher to consistently defend the Consti-
tution as it is. He is part of a grand tradition that embraces the
virtues and values of constitutionalism, which was given elo-
quent voice by Justice Robert H. Jackson, who wrote in the
landmark Steel Seizure Case: “With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive be under
the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary delibera-
tions” (Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 655, quoted
in Fisher, 2004, 281). 
REFERENCES
Adler, David Gray. 1988. The Constitution and PresidentialWarmaking: The
Enduring Debate.” Political Science Quarterly 103: 1–36.
Adler, David Gray. 2003. “Constitution, Foreign Aﬀairs and PresidentialWar-
Making: A Response to Professor Powell.” Georgia State University Law
Review 19: 947–1019.
Adler, David Gray. 2012. “The Framers and Executive Prerogative: A Consti-
tutional and Historical Rebuke.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 376–89.
Bas v. Tingy. 1800. 4 U.S. 4 (Dall.) 37.
Dean, John. 2007. Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the Leg-
islative, Executive, and Judicial Branches. NewYork: Viking.
Draper, Theodore. 1995. “Capturing the Constitution: Presidents, a Scholar
Contends, Have Simply Usurped the Power to MakeWar.” New York Times
Book Review, May 7. P1.
Elliot, Jonathan, ed. 1836. The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution.Washington, DC: J. Elliot. 5 vols.
Farrand, Max, ed. 1966. The Records of the Federal Convention. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 4 vols.
Fisher, Louis. 1997. “Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN
and NATO.” CaseWestern Reserve Law Review 47: 1237–79.
_. 2000. Congressional Abdication. College Station: Texas A&M Univer-
sity Press.
_. 2004. PresidentialWar Power, 2d ed. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas.
_. 2005. “Judicial Review of theWar Power.” Presidential Studies Quar-
terly 35: 466–95.
_. 2006. “From PresidentialWars to American Hegemony: The Consti-
tution After 9/11.” In The Presidency and the Challenge of Democracy, eds.
Michael A. Genovese and Lori Cox Han, 23–52. NewYork: Palgrave
MacMillan.
_. 2007a. “Invoking Inherent Powers: A Primer.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 37: 1–22.
_. 2007b. “The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The ‘Sole Organ’
Doctrine.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37: 139–52.
_. 2010. “The Law:WhenWars Begin: Misleading Statements by Presi-
dents.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 40: 171–84.
_. 2012. “The Law: Military Operations in Libya: NoWar? No Hostili-
ties?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42: 176–89.
Fisher, Louis, and David Gray Adler. 1998. “TheWar Powers Resolution:
Time to Say Goodbye.” Political Science Quarterly 113: 1–20.
Little v. Barreme. 1804. 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170.
Talbot v. Seeman. 1801. 4 U.S. (5 U.S.) 1.
United States v. Smith. 1806. 27 Fed. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
Wormuth, Francis D., and Edwin Firmage. 1986. To Chain the Dog ofWar: The




PS • July 2013 509
